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Embodiment of Rights in Goods and the
Concept of Chattel Paper
Thomas H. Jacksont
In the scheme of classifying collateral under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the concept of chattel paper plays a
prominent, but poorly articulated, role. Most practitioners who
deal with Article 9 are generally familiar with the definition of
chattel paper contained in section 9-105(b), the core of which pro-
vides that chattel paper "means a writing or writings which evi-
dence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a
lease of specific goods." 1 This definition appears simple, even
straightforward, yet the relationship between chattel paper and
rights in the underlying goods has been inexactly understood since
the drafting of the Code.2
This article asserts that this incomplete understanding of the
relation between chattel paper and rights in the underlying goods
stems from two sources. First, academics as well as practitioners
have failed to articulate precisely why, given the larger framework
of secured financing, a category of collateral known as chattel pa-
per exists. How chattel paper should be treated depends, in the
first instance, on why it exists at all. Second, the imprecision in
treating chattel paper as an embodiment of rights in goods' is part
of a larger failure to appreciate how the principle of ostensible
ownership shapes and informs all of Article 9.'
t Professor of Law, Stanford University. I would like to thank Douglas Baird, Bonnie
Jackson, and Robert Weisberg for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (1978). Unless otherwise noted, all Code references will be to the
1978 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code and will be cited by section number
only. For purposes of this article, these sections are identical to those of the 1972 Official
Text.
2 See Levie, Security Interests in Chattel Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935, 935 (1969) ("Chat-
tel paper financing is probably the least known major area of secured transactions law."
(footnote omitted)).
3 The definition in section 9-105(b) hints at, but fails to explore, the concept of "em-
bodiment." See Clark, Abstract Rights Versus Paper Rights under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 445 (1975) (calling such embodied rights "paper
rights").
4 Under the principle of ostensible ownership, an owner of property who accords,
through possession, apparent title in that property to someone else cannot later assert his
title against an innocent third party who dealt with the apparent owner. Ostensible owner-
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This article first offers what I believe to be the principal func-
tion of chattel paper: making tangible an abstract right called an
account receivable. So viewed, chattel paper furthers the Code's
dominant goal of increasing the negotiability of collateral.5 The ar-
ticle then explores the relation between that reification of an ab-
stract right and the opposite abstraction suggested by chattel pa-
per's embodiment of rights in tangible goods. This relation arises
out of the justification for chattel paper and is given meaning
through an understanding of both general contractual expectancies
and the role of ostensible ownership in a chattel security system.
The article finally examines the consequences for the other provi-
sions of, and policies underlying, Article 9 when this conception of
chattel paper is implemented.
I. THE BASIC TRANSACTION: CHATTEL PAPER ARISING FROM THE
SALE OF GOODS
As an initial step in the analysis, consider a simple transac-
tion. Industrial, a corporation located in New York, is a retail
merchant of heavy industrial machinery.' On January 1, Industrial
sells ten computerized drill presses to Manufacturer, a manufac-
turing corporation located in New Jersey. Each drill press has a
purchase price of $10,000. Manufacturer pays $10,000 down and
agrees to pay the remaining $90,000, plus an interest charge, in
twenty-four equal monthly installments. Industrial and Manufac-
turer sign an installment sales contract covering this transaction.
In this installment sales contract, Manufacturer grants Industrial a
security interest in the ten drill presses to secure Manufacturer's
obligations to Industrial arising out of the contract. Industrial files
ship is perhaps the most enduring principle of chattel security law. See, e.g., Sturtevant v.
Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 339-44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812); Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275,
279-80 (Pa. 1819). See also 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 14.1,
at 438-39 (1965) (discussion of history of requirement that secured party take possession of
collateral). Cf. Davis v. Turner, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 422, 426-28 (1848) (court held that ven-
dor's retention of personal property following an absolte sale created rebuttable presump-
tion of fraud).
For further discussion of the principle of ostensible ownership and its application in
Article 9, see Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 53 (1983); Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the
Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175 (1983).
1 See generally Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605 (1981).
1 The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank
(In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973). The actual facts of Leasing
Consultants, and the Second Circuit's opinion in the case, are discussed infra notes 66-86
and accompanying text.
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a financing statement in New Jersey against Manufacturer cover-
ing the drill presses.7
This transaction between Industrial and Manufacturer creates
chattel paper: the installment sales contract is a writing that evi-
dences, first, a monetary obligation-Manufacturer's obligation to
pay Industrial the remaining purchase price plus interest on the
drill presses-and, second, a security interest in specific
goods-the security interest Industrial has in the ten drill presses
that Manufacturer will now "own." 8 Yet, although the transaction
creates chattel paper, chattel paper is not relevant for any Article
9 purpose until it is used as collateral in a secured transaction.9
The only collateral in the hypothetical transaction between Indus-
trial and Manufacturer, however, is the ten drill presses.
Chattel paper takes on a life of its own when Industrial, the
seller and secured party in the transaction with Manufacturer,
changes its role and decides to become a debtor in a separate
transaction with yet another party. For example, Industrial may
need to borrow money from Bank. Industrial may offer as security
the installment sales contract arising out of the transaction be-
tween Industrial and Manufacturer. This installment sales contract
is an asset of Industrial because it provides Industrial with the
right to collect money from Manufacturer and, should Manufac-
turer default, the right to use the drill presses to ensure that it will
be paid.10
When Industrial uses this installment sales contract-now
chattel paper-as collateral with Bank, Bank takes over, at least
7 Drill presses are not "mobile goods" within the meaning of section 9-103(3). See In re
Dennis Mitchell Indus., 419 F.2d 349, 356-58 (3d Cir. 1969) (en banc). Industrial, therefore,
will be required to file where the goods are located or expected to be located according to
the terms of section 9-103(1)(a)-(c), (4).
s Thus, the two elements required under section 9-105(b) for the creation of chattel
paper are present. Moreover, once the drill presses are delivered to Manufacturer, this writ-
ing will be indispensable, as it will be necessary for Industrial to have a security agreement
signed by Manufacturer, as debtor, in order to have any security interest at all. § 9-203(1)-
(2). See generally Pontchartrain State Bank v. Poulson, 684 F.2d 704, 705-07 (10th Cir.
1982) (discussion of elements of § 9-203); In re Bollinger Corp., 614 F.2d 924, 926-27 (3d
Cir. 1980) (same). This requirement of a writing may be thought of as fundamental to per-
mitting the creation of a category of collateral such as chattel paper. Without this writing,
the effort to give substantive effect to physical possession of the paper would be meaning-
less. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (1952) (defining chattel paper as "a security agreement or lease of
a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with appropriate in-
dorsement or assignment").
9 "The creation of a security interest in chattel paper requires at least three parties who
take part in two consecutive transactions." Levie, supra note 2, at 936.
10 Exercise of these rights is subject to the default rules of part 5 of Article 9. See, e.g.,
§§ 9-502 to -504(2).
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contingently,11 Industrial's rights under the installment sales con-
tract. This gives Bank, in the event Industrial defaults, a right to
the stream of payments that represents Manufacturer's obligation
to pay Industrial.12 Should Bank take the proper steps to perfect
that right, Bank will enjoy it in priority to Industrial's other credi-
tors, including creditors of Industrial who acquire a property inter-
est in that right after Bank. s
Because of its security interest in the chattel paper, Bank also
takes over, again contingently and again up to the amount Indus-
trial owes Bank, Industrial's contingent right to use the drill
presses to satisfy Manufacturer's obligation to Industrial. This
right, too, is an asset of Industrial, for it improves Industrial's
prospects of being repaid in full from Manufacturer."
To say that Bank, in taking a security interest in the chattel
paper, has contingently succeeded to Industrial's rights as against
Manufacturer is to say that those rights have become "embodied"
11 The right is normally thought of as "contingent," with Bank succeeding to Indus-
trial's rights only if Industrial defaults. Often, however, Manufacturer's obligation to pay
Industrial is used as a primary repayment device on Industrial's obligation to repay Bank, in
a form of notification financing. See §§ 9-308 comment 1, -318; infra text following note 55.
'2 The rights Bank derives from Industrial are limited to the amount Industrial owes
Bank, § 9-504(2) & comment 3, unless it is determined that the transaction between Bank
and Industrial amounted to a "sale" of the chattel paper, instead of a secured transaction
involving chattel paper. See §§ 9-102(1)(b) & comments 2, 4, -104(f), -504(2). See also Ma-
jor's Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 542-46 (3d Cir. 1979) (distinguish-
ing between "sale" of and "security interest" in an account).
13 This states, in simplified form, the general "first in time, first in right" rule of Article
9. See, e.g., § 9-312(5). See also Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1161-64 (1979) (discussion of rules governing compet-
ing security interests in same property). Whether Bank will take priority over prior
financers of Industrial claiming an interest in the chattel paper under a "blanket" security
agreement and financing statement will depend on whether Bank perfects by filing or by
taking possession of the chattel paper. See §§ 9-304(1) (perfection by filing), -306(5) (prior-
ity rules upon repossession or return of goods), -308 (priority rules for purchasers of chattel
paper who take possession); infra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
4 Industrial's right to so use the drill presses will, if Industrial perfects its security
interest in a timely fashion, take priority over the rights of Manufacturer's other credi-
tors-secured and unsecured. See §§ 9-201, -301. Should Manufacturer file for bankruptcy,
Industrial's rights would also have priority over those of Manufacturer's trustee in bank-
ruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. V 1981). This discussion assumes that Industrial has
properly filed a financing statement covering the transaction. Since the drill presses will be
"equipment" in Manufacturer's hands, see § 9-109(2), Industrial, as a purchase money
seller, will have priority over all other secured parties if Industrial files the financing state-
ment within 10 days of the date Manufacturer takes possession of the drill presses, §§ 9-
107(a), -312(4). Since Bank will be unable to assert any greater rights against Manufac-
turer's other creditors than Industrial has, the remainder of the discussion assumes that
Industrial's rights against Manufacturer in the drill presses are perfected. Baird & Jackson,
supra note 4, at 203 & n.85 (discussing concept of derivative rights).
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in the chattel paper. As described, two rights appear embodied.
The first is the right of Industrial to be paid by Manufacturer-a
right that, in the absence of Industrial's security interest in the
drill presses, would be an "account" 15 or, if reflected by a note or
similar piece of paper, an "instrument.""' The second is Indus-
trial's right to use the drill presses to ensure that Manufacturer's
debt to Industrial will be paid, notwithstanding a default by
Manufacturer. 17
We will return to examine what result should follow under Ar-
ticle 9 from viewing these rights as embodied in chattel paper, but
the apparent consequence is that Industrial's creditors no longer
can deal with these rights as if they were not so embodied."8 Since
Manufacturer's obligation to pay Industrial is evidenced by chattel
paper, section 9-106 provides that it is not an account.1' In other
words, a security interest in Industrial's "accounts," as defined in
Article 9, would not cover Manufacturer's promise to pay Indus-
trial.2 0 By the same token, a security interest in Industrial's
"goods" 21 or "general intangibles '22 would not appear to cover In-
dustrial's right to use the drill presses to enforce Manufacturer's
promise to pay it.2 3 As with an interest in goods evidenced by a
'5 § 9-106.
,6 § 9-105(i).
17 There might be a third right as welh Industrial's right to retrieve the drill presses
upon a mutual cancellation of the contract for sale. For a discussion of this right, see infra
notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
18 "It is therefore practically necessary. . . to say that. . . one perfects as to the goods
by perfecting as to the chattel paper after the latter has been created." Clark, supra note 3,
at 464 (emphasis in original).
1' Section 9-106 provides: "'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold or
leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper,
whether or not it has been earned by performance."
20 Some of the problems of accounts being transformed into instruments are explored
by Clark, supra note 3. Much of his discussion would also apply to the problems of embody-
ing the right of payment in chattel paper. For a discussion of whether a security interest in
accounts should remain effective despite the embodiment of an account receivable in chattel
paper, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
21 §§ 9-105(h), 
-109.
22 § 9-106.
2' The scope of, and limitation on, this conclusion are discussed infra notes 87-134 and
accompanying text. I examine there the relation of a direct security interest in, for example,
inventory, to an indirect security interest, through chattel paper, in specific goods leased or
sold by a debtor.
The court in Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 486
F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1973), noting that Article 9 generally classifies collateral "according to
the nature or use of the underlying entity, rather than the character of its ownership at any
given time," suggested that a debtor's rights in goods, whether future or contingent, remain
"goods," and not "general intangibles," for the purposes of Article 9.
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negotiable document of title,24 the rights of Industrial as secured
creditor of Manufacturer to the drill presses have been "locked
up" in the chattel paper, and henceforth-at least for the duration
of the life of the chattel paper-one seeking to derive a full set of
rights in those drill presses from Industrial must deal with the
chattel paper and not simply with the goods themselves. 25
To perfect a security interest in either of these rights of Indus-
trial against Manufacturer, therefore, Bank must perfect a security
interest in the chattel paper: Bank must either take possession of
the chattel paper 26 or file a financing statement in New York, list-
ing Industrial as the debtor and covering the chattel paper.27
II. A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF CHATTEL PAPER
AND THE CONCEPT OF EMBODIMENT
The foregoing description of chattel paper, although familiar,
is misleading in suggesting that chattel paper embodies two dis-
tinct rights. In the typical sales transaction that gives rise to chat-
tel paper, such as that described above, the embodied rights-the
use of Manufacturer's promise to pay Industrial as collateral in In-
dustrial's transaction with Bank and the similar use of Industrial's
security interest in Manufacturer's drill presses-are so comple-
mentary as to appear to be fundamentally the same. To under-
stand this, one must have a sense of what a chattel-paper financer
in a transaction like the one described above normally perceives
his collateral to be.
" Section 9-304 comment 2 states:
[S]o long as a negotiable document covering goods is outstanding, title to the goods is,
so to say, locked up in the document and the proper way of dealing with such goods is
through the document. Perfection therefore is to be made with respect to the document
and, when made, automatically carries over to the goods. Any interest perfected di-
rectly in the goods while the document is outstanding (for example, a chattel mortgage
type of security interest on goods in a warehouse) is subordinated to an outstanding
negotiable document.
25 This leaves open the issues of when these rights become embodied in chattel paper
and how long that embodiment lasts. The remainder of this article is concerned with these
questions.
26 See § 9-305.
27 See § 9-304(1). Under section 9-103(4), financing statements covering chattel paper
should be filed where the debtor is located. It should be noted that there is a substantial
difference in the relative security offered by perfection by filing and perfection by posses-
sion. This is especially true if, in the case of filing, the chattel paper is not stamped to
indicate that it is subject to a security interest. See § 9-308 & comment 3.
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A. Contractual Expectancies, Paperized Rights, and Chattel
Paper
The rules of Article 9 seem premised on the belief that the
chattel-paper financer is actually a financer on its debtor's ac-
counts receivable-accounts receivable arising out of the sale or
lease of goods-but is not a financer on the underlying goods
themselves.28 Although we will later consider other transactions
that give rise to chattel paper, in the case of a debtor who is a
manufacturer or retail dealer of goods that are financed by a se-
cured party,. this assumption seems both correct as a matter of
common understanding and consistent with the dominant existing
rationale for secured credit.2
The person who finances on the basis of what we may generi-
cally call "accounts receivable" presumptively cares, in the first in-
stance, about their value-their collectability. A security interest
retained by a seller of goods to secure the unpaid purchase
price-the account receivable-directly enhances the collectability
of that account receivable by ranking the seller's ability to be paid
with those of the buyer's other creditors. For this reason, it may
well be a mistake in considering the function of chattel paper to
disaggregate its two parts-the account receivable and the interest
28 This notion is implicit in the comment to section 9-106, which states: "A right to the
payment of money is frequently buttressed by ancillary covenants to insure the preservation
of collateral . . . . Whatever perfection is required for an assignment of the right to the
payment of money will also carry these ancillary rights." Cf. Levie, supra note 2, at 936
("dealers and retailers often find themselves in a position where the asset upon which they
must raise the money necessary to conduct business is their chattel paper, i.e., somebody
else's obligation to them"). The rights in the underlying goods that secure the right to the
payment of money are best viewed as buttressing the payment right, thereby increasing its
value. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
21 Efficiency is probably the dominant explanation given in the literature today for the
existence of secured credit. Although efficiency rationales come in a variety of forms (such
as signaling explanations or risk-reduction explanations), the most widely developed effi-
ciency rationale rests in principal part on an assumption that certain lenders are more likely
to take security on certain kinds of assets either because of different monitoring abilities or
because of specialization in financing on particular types of collateral. This suggests that
people who finance on accounts receivable may have different skills from those who finance
on goods.
For a discussion of the monitoring and specialization rationale for secured credit, see
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 13, at 1149-61; see also D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SEcURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY ch. 4 (forthcom-
ing 1983); Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Corporate and Commercial Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Smith & Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital
Structure: Comment, 39 J. FIN. 247 (1979). For a criticism of the existing efficiency theories
as insufficiently powerful to explain the form of secured financing, see Schwartz, Security
Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1981).
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in goods. Instead, it may be preferable to recognize that the inter-
est in goods is ancillary to the account receivable and simply serves
to increase the value of the account.
Indeed, an Article 9 security interest is a right in goods only
for a very limited purpose: it is defined by, and limited to, the se-
curing of "payment or performance of an obligation. 3 0 Consistent
with this, a debtor can force a secured party to "dispose of the
collateral under Section 9-504,' 's l and the secured party must "ac-
count to the debtor for any surplus" realized upon such sale.
3 2
Thus although a security interest is a form of a property right in
goods or other collateral, it is distinct from other property interests
in one respect: it is inextricably tied to an account receivable, or
other payment or performance obligation, because it serves to en-
hance the prospects of repayment. Considered in this context, pre-
Code decisions made a great deal of sense in refusing to allow a
secured transfer of the security interest in the underlying goods
apart from a transfer of the associated obligation,3 for the col-
lectability of the obligation is directly tied to that security interest.
This distinction might suggest that Article 9 should not have
created a category of collateral known as "chattel paper," but,
rather, should have treated all rights to payments arising out of
transactions in goods (other than those embodied in instruments)
as "accounts." Yet chattel paper, like instruments, serves a role
that accounts do not.
The creation of a category of collateral known as chattel paper
appears to have been motivated by the perceived advantages of
"paperizing" the obligation otherwise represented by an account.4
If the legal rules permit, and if the paper can be identified with a
transaction, paperizing an intangible enables parties to determine
rights from the paper itself. This attribute of tangibility, where le-




See Epstein, Security Transfers by Secured Parties, 4 GA. L. REV. 527, 532-39
(1970); Note, Mortgages-Effect on Assignment without Assigning the Debt-Formalities
Necessary to Transfer the Mortgagee's Title to the Mortgaged Property, 36 N.C.L. REV.
225, 226-27 (1958). This principle has been applied to cases under the U.C.C. See, e.g., In re
AMSCO, Inc., 26 Bankr. 358 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Larson, (In re
Kennedy Mortgage Co.), 17 Bankr. 957, 965-66 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982).
3 See Clark, supra note 3, at 473-79 (inadequacies and costs of holding abstract rights
create pressures to reduce this sort of abstraction; the role of physical possession in inferring
ownership also calls for a reduction in abstraction). The term "paperizing" comes from Pro-
fessor Clark's article. Id. at 447 n.16.
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known as "negotiability." The key attribute of negotiability is that
possession and an examination of the paper establish the limits of
relevant information concerning ownership and thereby resolve
competing claims to the rights deemed embodied in that paper.
For such rules to have any meaning, however, there must not only
be something to possess, but also something that can be said with
some degree of assurance to embody the rights deemed embodied.
Although the potential for fraud remains, 5 chattel paper
meets those basic requirements 6 in a way that an account, which
is not based on an individualized writing, do not. 7 In large part,
therefore, the existence of chattel paper reflects the desire of the
Code drafters to promote the negotiability of collateral.3 8
The advantages of paperizing an intangible are derived from
giving substantive meaning to possession itself. Assume, for exam-
ple, that Industrial obtains a financing commitment both from
Bank and from Finance Company. Pursuant to Industrial's ar-
rangement, eighty percent of the purchase price of each machine
Industrial sells will be advanced by the institution that Industrial
chooses, subject to an aggregate limit for each institution. Without
a paperized category of collateral, both Bank and Finance Com-
pany would be required to file financing statements, presumably
on Industrial's "accounts," in order to perfect their interests. But
if Industrial wanted to obtain the financing from both Bank and
Finance Company on a first-priority basis, Bank and Finance Com-
pany would have to negotiate a subordination agreement, or some
other limitation of the scope of the financing statement, between
the institutions," and the arrangment would require a method of
determining, in the face of potential debtor misbehavior, which in-
stitution was financing which accounts.40
See infra note 42.
See supra text accompanying note 1; supra note 8.
37 An account may or may not be represented by a writing. See § 2-201. Chattel paper
arising from the sale of goods, however, will, because § 9-203(1)(a) requires a nonpossessory
security to be represented by a writing. Since many accounts will be represented by a writ-
ing, it is not inconceivable that the Code's paperizing principle could be extended further.
See supra note 8.
3 See Clark, supra note 3, at 473-79; Gilmore, supra note 5, at 607-12; Kripke, Chattel
Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209,
1224-27 (1950) (should "assimilate" chattel paper to negotiable instruments); cf. 2 G. GiL-
MoRE, supra note 4, § 25.5, at 666-69 (discussion of chattel paper as "quasi-negotiable"
collateral).
3' Section 9-316 provides: "Nothing in this Article prevents subordination by agree-
ment by any person entitled to priority."
40 For example, if Industrial presented a list of accounts to Bank, Bank might have to
develop a verification procedure with Finance Company to ensure that Industrial had not
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Paperizing the obligation, however, coupled with a legal rule
that gives priority to the possessor of the paper obligation,4' pro-
vides a simple alternative to an otherwise complex arrangement.42
Both Bank and Finance Company can finance based on the sales
contracts physically turned over to them. The institution possess-
ing the sales contract gains priority in the account, as well as in the
other rights embodied in that sales contract.
These advantages of negotiability 3 stem from the ability to
determine rights from possession. To the extent a chattel-paper
financer is relying on a filed financing statement, however, there is
no particular reason to treat-and Article 9 does not treat-the
rights of such a financer differently from the rights of a financer on
unembodied accounts.44 On the other hand, there is no reason why
a person who finances a debtor's "accounts" should not enjoy a
security interest in those accounts even after they become embod-
ied in chattel paper.
A holder of a security interest in accounts, of course, should be
trumped, if chattel paper's possession-based negotiability means
anything, by a person who gives new value and takes possession of
the chattel paper, just as such a person would take priority over a
chattel-paper financer who has perfected simply by a filing.45 But
first peddled these accounts to Finance Company. These procedures would not only be com-
plex, but they would also be subject to easy error by the implementing staff.
41 § 9-308(a). Even if Bank were to file a financing statement covering chattel paper, if
a specific sales contract were delivered to Finance Company, Finance Company would still
be "without knowledge" that this specific sales contract was subject to a security interest of
Bank. Id.; see also § 1-201(25) (definition of "notice").
"I The effectiveness of paperizing the obligation into a unique tangible object deter-
mines the residual levels of uncertainty or possibility of debtor misbehavior. Problems of
multiple originals of the sales contract provide the most obvious source of remaining
difficulties.
4' Chattel paper is sometimes called a form of "quasi-negotiable" collateral. 2 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 4, § 25.5, at 666-69 (describing chattel paper, along with non-negotiable
instruments and non-negotiable documents, as "quasi-negotiable collateral"); J. WHrE & R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-17, at 1078-
82 (2d ed. 1980) (discussion of "quasi-negotiable" nature of chattel paper). Here, quasi-
negotiability seems to refer to the possibility of filing with respect to these types of collat-
eral. But, unlike nineteenth-century forms of what were referred to as quasi-negotiable col-
lateral, chattel paper does not seem to be limited to notions of entrusting. See Gilmore,
supra note 5, at 610. Section 9-308 expresses the limit of negotiability for chattel paper. The
"extreme" negotiable collateral, such as instruments, embody all relevant information con-
cerning prior ownership claims, and, therefore, purchasers can perfect a security interest
only by taking possession. See §§ 9-105(1), -304(1), -309.
" The advantages of section 9-308 are limited to a "purchaser of chattel paper ... who
gives new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his business." (emphasis
added).
4' See id. Boss, Lease Chattel Paper: Unitary Treatment of a "Special Kind of Corn-
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the priority issues are, and should remain, distinct from the issues
concerning the existence of a security interest. Financers on a
debtor's accounts have little control over the paperizing of the ac-
counts receivable 46 , and, although the attributes of negotiability
may require subsequent possessors of the paperized right to pre-
vail, these attributes do not also suggest that "accounts" should be
defined so as to exclude accounts receivable embodied in chattel
paper.47
B. Embodiment of Rights in Goods: The Role of Ostensible
Ownership
Paperizing an account receivable so as to gain the attributes of
negotiability associated with physical possession may underlie the
creation of chattel paper as a distinct form of collateral. Yet, once
created, what should be the scope of the rights created by chattel
paper? At a minimum, chattel paper can be said to "embody" the
account receivable-this much follows from the justification for
chattel paper.
To what extent, however, should rights to the underlying
goods also be deemed to be embodied in the chattel paper? We
have seen, for example, that the value of an account receivable is
inextricably associated with its collectability. Chattel paper, there-
fore, is logically defined also to include the security interest re-
tained by a seller in the goods sold. The question, however, needs
to be focused more precisely. Is chattel paper arising from the
lease of goods like chattel paper arising from the sale of goods? Are
rights to get the goods back other than upon a default likewise
embodied in the chattel paper? The answer to questions such as
these clarifies the one aspect of chattel paper that has not been
mercial Specialty, 1983 DuKe L.J. 69, 105-06, seems to agree that the right to rentals arising
from lease should remain an "account," but then suggests that the consequence of this
would be that "financers who take possession of lease chattel paper may nevertheless have
their claims defeated by competing claims to the rentals themselves." As discussed in text,
however, if lease rentals were to remain "accounts," the concept of quasi-negotiability would
also seem to require possession of the chattel paper to trump filing as to the accounts. This
is possible, since continuation and priority are distinct issues.
"' See Clark, supra note 3, at 449-53.
47 The issue, ultimately, is whether the accounts financer should be required in the
security agreement and financing statement to describe the collateral as "accounts and chat-
tel paper" or whether subsequent parties should be required to read "accounts" as meaning
"accounts and chattel paper." However the issue is resolved, the parties can adjust their
behavior to the rule. The point is that defining accounts to include chattel paper is not
fundamentally inconsistent with either embodiment or the concept of negotiability.
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systematically analyzed.4
This inquiry is really more one of scope than one of concept.
To say that chattel paper can embody certain rights in goods is not
the same thing as saying that it should. I will narrow the norma-
tive inquiry by examining the relation between the concept of em-
bodiment and the principle of ostensible ownership. The analysis
seems most usefully conducted along two different planes: the first
involves examining the temporal limits on embodiment when deal-
ing with rights in goods; the second involves examining the quan-
tum of rights in goods that are embodied.
1. Temporal Limits on Embodiment of Rights in Goods. We
have seen how a chattel-paper debtor's rights in goods give value
to the account receivable now embodied in the chattel paper,
thereby becoming an inseparable part of that account receivable.
The reasons, however, that argued in the transaction above for
chattel paper to embody some,49 if not all, of a debtor's rights to
the goods also inform the contours and ultimate duration of that
embodiment.
Perhaps the most fundamental principle underlying Article 9
is ostensible ownership. Possession of personal property is the best
indication of ownership. When Industrial possesses goods, such as
drill presses, creditors of Industrial should be able to find out
about possible security interests in these drill presses by checking
the Article 9 files and seeing whether any financing statements ex-
ist that cover the drill presses.50
Should Industrial retain51 or regain possession of the drill
48 The most exhaustive analysis, focusing on chattel paper arising out of leases, is a
recent one, Boss, supra note 45. Professor Boss's article is rich in the history of assignment
of true leases and in discussing the contractual interests of the two parties to the transac-
tion, but spends little time analyzing the scope of the ostensible ownership principle and the
rights of third parties, or analyzing the tie between a right to payment of money and its
underlying security.
49 The quantum of Industrial's rights that should ever be embodied is discussed infra
notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
50 Other interests, such as "true" leases or bailments, are not governed by Article 9. See
§§ 1-201(21), 9-102(1). As a consequence, Industrial's creditors will only find out about some
categories of property claims in Industrial's drill presses by examining the files. The
problems created by this partial application of the ostensible ownership principle are ex-
plored in Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 196-201.
Apart from the problems arising from the limited scope of Article 9, it is important to
note that Article 9's notice filing system is not foolproof. Names change, use of collateral
changes, and debtors and collateral change location. The Code attempts to accommodate
these contingencies. See, e.g., §§ 9-103(1)(d), -306(3), -401(3), -402(7). Nonetheless, each of
those rules, although justifiable for risk allocation reasons, may render a given filing system
incomplete.
61 If Industrial retained possession of the drill presses until Manufacturer paid for them
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presses, it would be inconsistent with the ostensible ownership
principle to hold that Bank held a perfected interest in any of In-
dustrial's rights in the drill presses by virtue of Bank having pos-
session of the chattel paper. 52 A contrary conclusion would leave
Industrial's other creditors with no external indicia, such as non-
possession by Industrial or a filing against Industrial (covering
goods or chattel paper), that someone claimed interests in the
goods.
In the transaction just discussed, Article 9 would not permit
Bank to retain, vis-a-vis third parties, an interest in the drill
presses once Industrial regained possession of them. Section 9-
306(5) provides that, although Bank will retain a security interest
in the drill presses that is good against Industrial, it "must be per-
fected for protection against creditors of the transferor [Industrial]
and purchasers of the returned or repossessed goods."53 This rule
provides that upon repossession (or, indeed, any other form of re-
acquisition) of the goods by Industrial," Bank must take affirma-
in full, the ostensible ownership principle would arise ab initio. This issue should be re-
solved as it would be in the case of returned or repossessed goods. See infra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text. See generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 4 (discussion of effect of
ostensible ownership on perfection and priority of security interest). This approach, how-
ever, was not followed in American State Bank v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 71 Cal. App. 3d 774,
139 Cal. Rptr. 658, decision withdrawn from official reporter, 141 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1977). At
issue was the effect of sham sales of motorhomes on the rights of the bank that had been
assigned the fraudulent conditional sales contracts and of the dealer's floor-plan financer.
Notwithstanding the dealer's retention of the vehicles in inventory, the court accorded pri-
ority to the bank, as a chattel-paper financer, on the grounds that the chattel paper gave
priority in the underlying goods themselves, and that the inventory financer should bear the
burden of monitoring the debtor. 139 Cal. Rptr. at 663, 665-66.
52 See generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 4 (discussion of ostensible ownership
problems created by nonpossessory security interests).
" § 9-306(5)(d); see id. comment 4. The rules of section 9-306(5) are explored in 2 G.
GiLMoRE, supra note 4, § 27.5, at 736-38; Skilton & Dunham, Security Interests in Re-
turned and Repossessed Goods Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 WIL-
LAmETr L.J. 779 (1981); Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible
Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907, 971-83 (1978); Lord, Rights of Secured Creditors in Returned
and Repossessed Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study of Section 9-306(5),
15 DuQ. L. REV. 165 (1976-77). Sections 9-306(5)(b), -308 do give Bank a security interest
that may be effective against a prior inventory financer of Industrial, even though the lat-
ter's security interest "reattaches" when the goods are returned to Industrial. This rule is
analyzed infra notes 124-48 and accompanying text.
" Section 9-306(5), which governs rights in returned or repossessed goods, does not
reach the situation in which, following an installment sale, Industrial retains possession of
the goods sold until final payment, and hence retains either a security interest or title. Cf.
Chartered Bank v. Chrysler Corp., 115 Cal. App. 3d 755, 171 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1981) (after
sale, manufacturer held to have retained possession of goods; under § 9-203, dealer's assign-
ment of chattel paper gave no enforceable security interest to chattel-paper financer because
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tive steps to perfect its security interest in the drill presses
themselves.
By filing a financing statement covering the drill presses at the
same time as it perfects its interest in the chattel paper, Bank can,
of course, obviate this need to take affirmative steps after Indus-
trial's repossession. Whether Bank will be motivated to do this
will depend on the risk that Industrial will repossess without prior
notice to Bank. This risk, in turn, may depend in substantial part
on Bank's form of chattel-paper financing. In the case of direct no-
tification financing, Bank notifies Manufacturer to pay it directly
and thereby puts Manufacturer on notice that henceforth it should
treat Bank as the assignee of all of Industrial's rights in the ac-
count and its associated security interest. In that event, Bank may
face no substantial risk of Industrial's repossession without Bank's
knowledge, and hence it may have no particular need to file a
financing statement covering Industrial's goods. In the case of non-
notification financing, however, where the risk of such repossession
will, all other things being equal, be greater, Bank either will have
to adjust for that risk (by advancing less on the chattel paper) or
file a financing statement covering Industrial's goods.
Article 9, on first glance, appears to work adequately in the
transaction we have just described, for it ties the duration of chat-
tel paper's embodiment of rights in goods to the ostensible owner-
ship concerns that underlie all of Article 9. Yet reflection on .the
nature of the chattel-paper transaction and on its relation to the
ostensible ownership principle suggests several questions. First, it
is not immediately clear that there would in fact be anything mis-
leading about a legal rule that continued the concept of embodi-
ment, notwithstanding Industrial's retention or reacquisition of the
goods, at least where Bank has filed a financing statement covering
"chattel paper."
debtor never had right to possession). In this instance, "embodiment" in the chattel paper
of Industrial's rights to the goods "sold" seems inconsistent with the ostensible ownership
principle, see supra note 51, and might run afoul of the "fraud by possession" principle, see
§ 2-402(2). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 3340 (West 1970); Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337,
344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (except in special cases, a voluntary sale of goods with an agree-
ment that allows the vendor to retain possession is "fraudulent and void" as against
creditors).
5 § 9-306 comment 4; see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. McCoy (In re Frontier Mobile
Home Sales, Inc.), 635 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1980); Citizens & S. Factors, Inc. v. Small Business
Admin., 375 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1979). Since the goods are not mobile goods within the scope of
section 9-103(3), see supra note 7, the filing would have to be made in the jurisdiction where
Industrial repossessed the goods or where it kept the goods following repossession, § 9-
103(1).
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A notice filing system conveys the information that the legal
rules prescribe it to convey.56 One learns, for example, that if a
financing statement naming Industrial as debtor covers "drill
presses" or "equipment and inventory" or, even, perhaps, "all
goods, ' 57 subsequent creditors are forewarned that Industrial's
drill presses are not available as collateral for a secured loan, at
least not without a substantial risk of loss of priority to another.
But the legal rule defines the scope of that financing statement
and, hence, the scope of the risk. Article 9 could provide that a
security interest in goods acquired through the perfection by filing
of a security interest in chattel paper remains perfected notwith-
standing retention or reacquisition of the goods by the debtor.
There is no reason to believe that most Article 9 financers could
not, or would not, accommodate to such a rule; thus, the words
"chattel paper" in a financing statement would provide equal no-
tice to them of a potential security interest in goods in the posses-
sion of the debtor as does "equipment and inventory." 58
In discussing Article 9's notice filing system, the issue is risk
allocation,* and here, as elsewhere, resolution of that issue should
turn on an understanding of the relative costs imposed. 9 Section
9-306(5) places the risk created by the debtor's retention or reac-
quisition of the goods on the chattel-paper financer, who must ei-
ther monitor his debtor for such events or file initially a financing
5s See generally Baird, supra note 4 (functions and limitations of notice filing); Baird &
Jackson, supra note 4 (function of notice filing in informing third parties of nonpossessory
interest in property).
57 The adequacy of each of these descriptions is the subject of a large body of case law.
Courts, for reasons that are rarely articulated, tend to consider financing statements that
simply describe the collateral in general terms, such as "all goods" or "all personal prop-
erty," to be insufficient under section 9-402. See, e.g., Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Fuqua), 461 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Mansour, 29 Bankr. 114, 115 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1983); Davis v. Kisko (In re McKeon), 7 Bankr. 10, 12-13 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
But see In re JCM Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 247, 249-50 (W.D. Mich. 1970)
(Ref.) ("all tangible property" held sufficient description of collateral). The justification for
a reluctance to uphold such descriptions, given the function of Article 9's notice filing sys-
tem, is not self-evident. Article 9's notice filing system seems designed principally to allow
creditors to stake claims to assets and to warn subsequent claimants that these assets may
no longer be treated as if they were unencumbered. Baird, supra note 4, at 59-67. From this
perspective, "all goods" seems essentially unambiguous.
" The rules for filing against chattel paper are based on the location of the debtor, not
on the location of the collateral. See § 9-103(1), (3). The result just discussed is seen most
easily when one would search for both the collateral and the debtor in the same jurisdiction.
Even if this were not the case, a different legal rule would simply require subsequent credi-
tors to check two different locations. Whatever costs this rule might entail, the security
interests would be discoverable through external indicia.
"9 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 177, 190-94.
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statement covering "goods" to deal, automatically, with that risk.60
The opposite rule would require subsequent parties to read "chat-
tel paper" as a warning about potential interests in the underlying
goods as well, to search for financing statements against the debtor
covering chattel paper, and to demand other collateral-or a sub-
ordination agreement with the chattel-paper financer-in the
event of finding such a financing statement.
There are, however, several decisive reasons for placing the
risk on the chattel-paper financer. First, as already noted, it is not
only possible but preferable to perfect security interests in chattel
paper by taking possession of the chattel paper instead of by
filing. 1 Chattel paper exists to capture the attributes of negotiabil-
ity that stem from limiting priority information to possession of
the paper itself. Given the primacy of possession of the paper,
chattel paper's embodiment of the debtor's interest in the underly-
ing goods is consistent with the ostensible ownership principle only
so long as the debtor is not in possession of those goods. Once the
debtor is back in possession of the goods, however, a rule that vali-
dated the perfected security interests in the goods via possession of
the chattel paper would create a lien on those goods that could not
be discovered by simple external search."
It would be possible, of course, to provide a different result for
security interests in chattel paper perfected by the filing of a
financing statement instead of by possession, but this solution
would leave some advantages to taking a possessory security inter-
est in chattel paper and some advantages to filing a financing
" See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 27. Indeed, possession is often viewed as the preferred method of
perfection; hence the rule of section 9-308. See 2 G. GILMoPn, supra note 4, § 25.5, at 667-
69.
'2 The debtor could, of course, tell a searcher about the chattel-paper financer. The
scheme of Article 9, however, is built on the belief that, because debtors have incentives to
misbehave, external indicia of rights and priorities are needed to supplement information
garnered from debtors. See, e.g., Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing
Under Article 9 (pt. 1), 59 B.U.L. REv. 1, 35-41 (1979). This problem is not acute when the
debtor is not in possession of the underlying goods. When, for example, the drill presses are
in the hands of Manufacturer, if Industrial tries to persuade someone to lend it money on
the basis of Industrial's rights in the drill presses, that person is on notice, by the very fact
that Industrial is out of possession, that he must investigate further to find out about Indus-
trial's purported rights in those goods. Through investigation, the party will know whether
chattel paper exists and whether Industrial still holds the unlegended original. See Baird &
Jackson, supra note 4, at 179-96; see Clark, Bankers' Guide to UCC Filing
Problems-Loans for Equipment Leasing, 92 BANKINo L.J. 222, 238-39 (1975); Note, In re
Leasing Consultants, Inc.: The Double Perfection Rule for Security Assignments of True
Leases, 84 YALE L.J. 1722, 1732-33 (1975).
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statement covering chattel paper. If both actions are going to be
"required" for purposes of fully perfecting an interest in the un-
derlying goods, there seems to be no particular reason not to have
the filed financing statement specify "inventory" and not "chattel
paper"-the result that is reached by concluding, as section 9-
306(5) suggests, that chattel paper no longer embodies rights to the
goods once the goods are back in the hands of the chattel-paper
debtor.63
2. The Quantitative Question: Embodiment of Rights in
Goods and the Lease Transaction. In the case of a sale of goods
that generates an installment sales contract, treating the seller's
resulting paper as embodying the seller's rights to the goods that
secure the account receivable is a logical outgrowth of the concept
of such an account receivable. That the drafters of Article 9 de-
cided, moreover, to create a new category of collateral-chattel pa-
per-to deal with such accounts receivable stems from their desire,
by paperizing an intangible, to secure the advantages of negotiabil-
ity." Should the embodiment of rights in goods, however, be car-
ried over from sales to other types of transactions involving the
owner of goods? Industrial, for example, may lease its goods to
Manufacturer for a week or a year, with or without an option for
Manufacturer to purchase or to cancel.6 5 In these cases, Industrial
may reacquire the goods from Manufacturer through a default of
Manufacturer, through a termination of the lease by time, or by
Manufacturer's exercise of a unilateral right to cancel.
To begin to consider this, it is worth exploring the famous case
of In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.s6 In that case, Leasing Consul-
93 Besides directness itself, this solution would avoid the uncomfortable result reached
if the debtor possesses the collateral in one state and yet has its chief executive offices in
another. In that event, section 9-103(1), (3), & (4) would provide different jurisdictions for
filing.
" Article 9 provides for a degree of negotiability with respect to chattel paper that is
unavailable with respect to an account, since an account is "not evidenced by an indispensa-
ble writing," § 9-106 comment. The negotiability of chattel paper is provided for in section
9-308, and one of the consequences of negotiability is that perfection by possession of the
chattel paper is not only possible, see § 9-305, but, because of the priority rules of section 9-
308, is the preferred method of perfecting. Distinguishing between accounts, chattel paper,
and, indeed, instruments creates other problems, principally because all three of these cate-
gories of Article 9 collateral may reflect, or embody, a right to a payment of money arising
out of a sale or other transaction in goods. These problems are examined in detail in Clark,
supra note 3. See also supra note 43. Article 9 could reduce at least some of these conflicts
by providing that a security interest in "accounts" also covered "chattel paper." See supra
note 45 and accompanying text.
" Section 9-105(b) defines chattel paper so as to cover lease transactions in goods.
Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 486 F.2d 367 (2d
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tants ("Leasing"), a New York corporation, "leased" equipment to
Plastimetrix, a New Jersey corporation, filing in New Jersey, "for
informational purposes only," a financing statement listing Leasing
as secured party/lessor and Plastimetrix as debtor/lessee. Leasing
then borrowed money from First National City Bank ("Citibank"),
giving Citibank, under a "Loan and Security Agreement," "a con-
tinuing security interest in the lease(s) and the property leased."67
Citibank took possession of the leases and filed financing state-
ments in New York, listing Leasing as debtor and describing the
collateral covered by the financing statement as "leases and any
and all rents due and to become due thereunder, including all re-
lated equipment described therein, chattel paper represented
thereby, accounts receivable therewith and proceeds arising there-
from."6s Thereafter, and within about two weeks of each other,
Leasing and Plastimetrix both were adjudicated bankrupts under
the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898.69
The issue in the case concerned Leasing's general creditors'
rights against Citibank in the leases assigned to Citibank and in
the equipment leased to Plastimetrix.70 The Second Circuit held71
that Citibank had properly perfected its security interest in the
chattel paper and, therefore, had perfected its security interest in
the rights embodied in the chattel paper.
Cir. 1973). A substantially similar dispute, involving the same parties, arose in Feldman v.
First Nat'l City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 368 F. Supp. 1333, 1339-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
87 486 F.2d at 369.
Id. at 369 n.1. Under section 9-402(b), a financing statement need only indicate the
"types" of collateral it covers. Citibank argued unsuccessfully that its security interest in
Leasing's rights to get the equipment back at the termination of the lease was perfected
because it was a "general intangible." 486 F.2d at 371-72. This argument, however, would
have made sense only if Citibank's financing statement covered general intangibles. A gen-
eral intangible is defined in section 9-106 as "any personal property (including things in
action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and money."
69 Pub. L. No. 55-171, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed prospectively, effective Oct.
1, 1979, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as Title
11 of U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981))).
70 There was no dispute regarding Leasing's rights against Plastimetrix's creditors,
since Leasing either had the right to repossess the machines as owner (if the leases were true
leases) or as perfected secured party (if the leases were security leases). The only issue was
who among Leasing's creditors would enjoy the benefits of Leasing's rights.
71 486 F.2d at 371-72. The opinion of the Second Circuit is somewhat cryptic and
opaque. In discussing what the court "held," I am dotting some i's and crossing some t's, but
I believe that the description of what the court held is fairly extractable from the opinion.
The case was remanded to determine whether the leases were true leases or security leases.
Id. at 323. See also Clark, supra note 62, at 235-37 (assuming that the Second Circuit's
holding granted Citibank a perfected security interest in those of Leasing's rights embodied
in the chattel paper).
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The troublesome issue, as the Second Circuit saw it, was the
extent to which the chattel paper embodied rights in the underly-
ing goods. According to the court, if the leases were security leases,
the chattel paper would embody all of Leasing's rights in the un-
derlying collateral, 2 presumably on the ground that, since the
transaction between Leasing and Plastimetrix would fundamen-
tally constitute a "sale,"73 all of Leasing's remaining rights in the
collateral would be captured in the concept of its "security inter-
est" in the goods.
The Second Circuit found that if the leases were true leases,
however, Leasing would have two distinct rights in the underlying
equipment, and only one of the two rights would be embodied in
the chattel paper. 4 Even though chattel paper, by definition, cov-
ers both a "monetary obligation" and a "lease of. . . goods,"7' 5 a
true lease between Leasing and Plastimetrix, as the Second Circuit
saw matters, would cover only Leasing's rights to get the equip-
ment back during the term of the lease because of a default by
Plastimetrix.7 6 Leasing's right to get the equipment back at the
normal termination of the lease (i.e., as a result of the passage of
time, and not as a result of a default) would be a reversionary
right, and this reversionary right would not be a part of a "lease of
i. . goods" but, rather, would be retained by Leasing outside of
the lease.77 Since it would be retained independently of the lease,
and since it is the lease that would constitute chattel paper, the
concept of chattel paper would not embody Leasing's reversionary
rights. This result was perhaps explained most clearly by Judge
Weinstein, in the district court's opinion:78
In a lease transaction, the lessor owns the property. Un-
like the situation where the purported lease is really a condi-
tional sales agreement and the "lessor" holds only a security
interest in the goods, the lessor in a true lease situation has a
reversionary interest. . . . A reversionary interest is that resi-
due of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession
72 486 F.2d at 372.
73 The tests for deciding whether a lease is a "security lease" frequently look to see
whether the essence of the transaction is that of a "sale." See Mooney, Personal Property
Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1610-13 (1981).
74 486 F.2d at 371-72.
75 § 9-105(b).
7' 486 F.2d at 372.
77 Id.
78 Feldman v. First Nat'l City Bank (In re Leasing Consultants, Inc.), 351 F. Supp.
1390 (E.D.N.Y.), remanded for evidentiary hearing, 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971).
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after the determination [sic] of some particular estate granted
out by him.9
This explanation of the result in Leasing Consultants has
been attacked as being inconsistent with the definition of chattel
paper.80 Yet such an argument from definition is overly formalistic.
The Leasing Consultants rationale is not necessarily inconsistent
with the concept of chattel paper as an embodiment of rights.""
The question to be addressed initially is one of the extent to which
chattel paper embodies a lessor's rights in the goods. It is the an-
swer to that inquiry, in turn, that provides the proper perspective
from which to analyze the decision in Leasing Consultants.
The concerns involved can be seen most clearly, perhaps, by
examining the case of a lease of drill presses from Industrial to
Manufacturer for one week (payment by Manufacturer to come at
the end of the week), with no option for Manufacturer to renew
the lease or to purchase the goods. If Bank finances Industrial on
the security of Industrial's "leases," Bank is essentially financing
on the stream of payments Industrial is entitled to receive from its
lessees. Here, as in the sale of goods, Industrial's right to get the
goods back, if Manufacturer should breach during the term of the
lease, affects the value of this rental obligation. The damages In-
dustrial will be entitled to recover from Manufacturer will depend
on the difference between the rental rate to Manufacturer and the
Id. at 1392-93 (citations omitted); see also Levie, supra note 2, at 940-41 (arguing
that a perfected security interest in a lease does not encompass a security interest in the
goods themselves beyond the terms of the lease).
so Note, supra note 62, at 1729-30 (concluding that the "lease. . . of goods" language
of § 9-105(b) makes no sense in the case of a true lease unless it refers to the reversion).
82 A perfected security interest need not encompass all the rights hovering around a
given transaction. This fact is most commonly seen in the case of true leases from the other
side of the transaction, when the lessee seeks to use his rights under the lease as security. If
a creditor were to take a perfected security interest in the lessee's rights under the lease and
if the lessee subsequently defaulted on his rental payments, the lessor's right to get back the
goods would be superior to the creditor's perfected security interest in the term of the lease.
The lessee's rights in the goods are governed by the lease, and he can grant no more exten-
sive rights to his creditor. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 203 & n.85 (discussing
notion of derivative rights as the norm). Unlike the lessee, the true lessor has rights in the
goods during the term of the lease and rights in the goods after the term of the lease. By
analogy to our sales transaction, see supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text, the lessor's
rights during the term of the lease are integrally tied to the transaction giving rise to the
stream of payments because the right to get leased goods back on default, and thereby to re-
let them, affects the likelihood that the lessor will be made whole on its expected stream of
rental payments. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. When a lessor grants a chat-
tel-paper security interest in the lease, therefore, he necessarily encumbers his rights in the
goods during the term of the lease, but not necessarily his rights in the goods after the term
of the lease. See also Boss, supra note 45, at 76.
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market rate of the lease for its remaining term.2 Whether or not
Manufacturer is insolvent, the amount Manufacturer will owe In-
dustrial as a result of the breach of its lease will be a function of
the amount Industrial will be able to acquire by using or leasing
the goods for the duration of the lease.85
Industrial's right to recover the goods upon Manufacturer's
breach, unlike the reversion, appears to be an ancillary part of
the rental obligation created by Manufacturer and Industrial, for it
directly affects the amount Industrial is entitled to recover against
Manufacturer. Since the value of this right must be subtracted
from the original rental obligation of Manufacturer to determine
Industrial's damage claim against Manufacturer, it also seems to
be an integral part of Industrial's assignment to Bank of the "ac-
count receivable" arising from the lease transaction with
Manufacturer.8 5
Yet, assuming Industrial and Bank intend to create a security
interest not only in the lease, but also in Industrial's reversionary
right to the goods,88 the fundamental Article 9 question remains:
for purposes of perfection-and hence priority over third par-
ties-should perfection of an interest in the chattel paper serve to
perfect an interest in the reversion as well? The remaining pages
explore this question as it affects both subsequent creditors and
8s This analysis reflects the normal contract price less market price measure of contract
damages. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 12.8-12.11, at 838-58 (1982). If there has
been no shift in the market price, Industrial can always re-lease the goods. 'Whether Indus-
trial would then be entitled to damages would depend on whether Industrial was a lost-
volume lessor. See Goetz & Scott, Measuring Seller's Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31
STAN. L. REv. 323, 330-54 (1979) (developing an economic model for assessing lost-volume
damages in excess of the contract-market price differential).
83 This analysis reflects the general rule that an injured party's recovery for breach of
contract is limited by a duty to mitigate damages. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 82,
§ 12.12, at 858-68.
The precise scope of what is covered by the term "reversion" is explored infra notes
124-49 and accompanying text.
85 The failure systematically to perceive this tie flaws Professor Boss's otherwise careful
analysis. See Boss, supra note 45, at 87 ("Conceptually and functionally, the assignment of
a true lease resembles an account far more than it resembles chattel paper. . . . From the
viewpoint of the assignee, the true lease and the pure or unconditional installment sale con-
tract are virtually identical in that they both evidence the right to the payment of money,
which is transferred to the assignee . . . . By content, the transfer of a security lease
transfers not only the monetary obligation but the security as well."); see also id. ("Like the
assignment of an installment sales contract, the assignment of a true lease transfers an un-
secured right to payment."). Professor Boss later appears to recognize this tie, in discussing
returned goods, id. at 98-99.
s The parties in the Leasing Consultants case did intend to create a security interest
in the lease and in the reversionary right. Citibank took a security interest in "the lease(s)
and the property leased." 486 F.2d at 369.
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existing inventory financers of Industrial.
a. Chattel paper, embodiment, and the rights of subsequent
creditors. Consider first the perspective of subsequent property
claimants who wish to take a security interest in Industrial's goods.
The inquiry has two parts. As we have already seen, while the
goods are in the hands of Industrial, the principle of ostensible
ownership suggests that chattel paper should not continue to em-
body rights in the goods, whether the rights asserted to be embod-
ied are those derived from Industrial's security interest, lease, or
reversion .17 In that event, chattel paper's negotiability is funda-
mentally at odds with Article 9's baseline principle of obviating os-
tensible ownership of goods by making security interests in goods
discoverable by possession or defined files.,
Can this result be extracted from Article 9? Section 9-306(5)
will provide no direct assistance, for that section applies only to
the sale of goods, 9 and it seems reasonably certain that in the case
of a true lease of goods, there will usually be no basis for conclud-
ing that there has been a sale.90 Despite that, however, it seems
that the definition of chattel paper itself can be used to provide
much the same result. A security interest in chattel paper should
embody a right to goods only so long as that chattel paper is in
force. It requires no great stretch of one's imagination, legal or oth-
erwise, to conclude that after a repossession by the lessor following
a default under a true lease, the lease is effectively terminated. 91 In
that event, there seems to be no reason to conclude, even without
the direct assistance of section 9-306(5), that a security interest in
the chattel paper no longer provides a security interest in the un-
derlying goods that is effective against other property claimants of
the debtor.
So long as the goods remain in the hands of Manufacturer,
87 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
Cf. Truck, Tractor & Forwarding Co. v. Baker, 281 Pa. 145, 148-49, 126 A.2d 239,
240-41 (1924) (assignee's failure to perfect interest in returned goods is a secret lien and
hence fraudulent).
89 Section 9-306(5) begins with the following language: "If a sale of goods results in an
account or chattel paper which is transferred by the seller to a secured party, and if the
goods are returned to or repossessed by the seller or the secured party, the following rules
determine priorities ... 
"o Section 2-106(1) states that a "'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price (Section 2-401)." See Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391,
394-96 (5th Cir. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-39, 208 N.W.2d
97, 106 (1973).
91 Section 9-105(b), that is to say, should be read to refer to a writing that "evidences"
a "lease of specific goods" only when the lease has not been terminated by repossession.
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however, the inquiry is distinct. It was earlier suggested that chat-
tel paper embodies, during the term of Manufacturer's possession
of the drill presses, Industrial's security interest in, or rights dur-
ing the term of the lease to, those drill presses because these rights
constituted a part of the intangible payment obligation that chat-
tel paper exists to paperize.92 The question remaining is whether
Industrial's rights to get the goods back when the lease terminates
for reasons other than a breach by Manufacturer-the rever-
sion-should also be considered embodied in the chattel paper
while Manufacturer is in possession of the goods.
A conclusion that reversionary rights to goods are also embod-
ied in chattel paper means that subsequent secured claimants of
Industrial need to assume that goods not in Industrial's hands are
unavailable as collateral unless Industrial is able to show them the
unlegended original of the chattel paper s3 The opposite conclu-
sion, on the other hand, would mean that a chattel-paper financer
of Industrial who also wished to take a security interest in all of
Industrial's rights in those goods, and not just the rights ancillary
to the payment obligation under the lease, would either have to file
against the goods where the goods are located or otherwise perfect
an interest in those goods, 4 in addition to perfecting against the
chattel paper. Subsequent creditors, in that event, would, at a min-
imum, have to check the files in the jurisdiction where the goods
were located in order to ascertain the existence of any such inter-
ests. Such creditors, as we explore below, might also have to check
with the lessee.
Here, as in many other places in commercial law, it may be
more important to have a rule that is clear and precise rather than
standards that are imprecise and subject to litigation. 5 The prob-
lem with the approach of Leasing Consultants is not that a non-
embodiment rule is necessarily worse than an embodiment rule,
but that the choice of rule hinges upon the form of the underlying
transaction. The Leasing Consultants analysis requires one to dis-
t' See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
3 A lease that does not state that it is subject to a security interest will allow a party,
by taking possession of the lease, to assume the negotiability protections of section 9-308,
see § 9-308 & comments 2-3.
It would be possible to file where Industrial normally possessed the goods, if the
goods were thereafter not in another jurisdiction (in the hands of Manufacturer or anyone
else) for more than four months. See § 9-103(1)(d).
95 See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 206-07; Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Stan-
dards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1227-
31 (1982).
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tinguish between "true" and "security" leases, an inquiry that is
either fact-specific and messy96 or governed by arbitrary rules that
bear little relation to the economic distinctions between the
transactions.97
Moreover, Leasing Consultants leaves open the question of
what to do in the case of a "security lease" where there is a "rever-
sion," not because of a default, but because, contrary to the "secur-
ity lease" label, there has been a decision by the "lessee" either to
exercise an option to cancel or not to exercise an option to
purchase.9 8 These cases can perhaps be handled within the Leasing
Consultants framework by application of section 9-306(5), but that
section applies only when there has been a "sale of goods."99 It is
by no means certain that all transactions that are deemed to be
"security leases" for purposes of section 1-201(37)100 will also be
" See, e.g., In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139, 1143-45 (7th Cir. 1982) (re-
jecting a rule-oriented test under § 1-201(37) for determining whether a lease is intended for
security and concluding that a characterization depends upon the court's assessment of the
particular facts); Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security
Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 909, 934-35
(reading the language of § 1-201(37) as requiring a factual inquiry to determine whether a
lease is "true" or intended for security).
'7 See, e.g., Aoki v. Shepherd Mach. Co. (In re J.A. Thompson & Son), 665 F.2d 941,
946-47 (9th Cir. 1982) (construing CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(37) (West Supp. 1982), the court
concluded that "if a lease contains an option to purchase 'for no additional consideration or
for nominal consideration,' it is conclusively presumed to be 'intended as security,' without
reference to other facts from which the opposite inference might be drawn," including op-
tions to cancel); Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 575, 500 P.2d 708, 709
(1972) (concluding that an option to purchase for nominal consideration alone indicates that
the lease is intended for security). See also In re Wright Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 598
(M.D.N.C. 1968) (a case decided under pre-Code law holding that no option to purchase
means that the lease cannot be a security lease, even though annual option to renew at
nominal price existed for life of machinery).
"' For example, under the approach of cases such as Aoki v. Shepherd Mach. Co. (In re
J.A. Thompson & Son), 655 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1982), transactions cast in the form of a lease
may be deemed a "security lease" by virtue of a nominal option to purchase at the end of
the lease, even though there is a substantial possibility that the lease will be terminated
before then through means other than default. Such a result might occur, for example, if the
lease were a month-to-month lease, with an option to renew each month. Furniture rentals
are sometimes structured this way, often giving the lessee an option to acquire the furniture
outright for little or no additional consideration after two to three years of such leasing.
Most furniture rental lessees, however, never renew the leases for the duration necessary to
activate the "bargain" option to purchase. When the furniture store takes the furniture back
at the end of the lease, it does so as owner, not as a secured party exercising a right of
default under part 5 of Article 9.
"9 See supra note 89.
100 Section 1-201(37) provides:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case;
however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one
intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of
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deemed to be "sales" by the distinct requirements for finding a
"sale of goods." 10 1
It is, of course, easier to see that a single rule would be prefer-
able to the two rules of Leasing Consultants than it is to pick the
superior rule. That choice should be based on the relative costs
and advantages of the various rules, a matter on which we can ulti-
mately only speculate. But this speculation can start from a
reasonably firm baseline. If all chattel-paper financers were really
financers only on the accounts receivable of a debtor,102 and if
other secured creditors-those who financed on goods-actually
sought security interests in a debtor's nonpossessory reversionary
rights, the nonembodiment rule would be clearly preferable.
The accuracy of this conclusion can be ascertained by examin-
ing the effects of a rule that, as to third parties, treated chattel
paper as embodying reversionary rights in goods. Such a rule
would create a situation in which subsequent secured creditors of
Industrial wishing to take a security interest in the reversion would
have to negotiate with Bank.103 As a consequence, even though
Bank was not asserting an interest in the reversion, Bank would be
in a position to block other creditors from loaning money to Indus-
trial on a first priority basis. Subsequent creditors would either
have to negotiate with Bank for Bank's subordination or raise their
interest rates against Industrial.
In either event, Bank would acquire a "blocking" power that
would enable it to garner a premium later for its agreement to
subordinate. Although this would be advantageous to Bank, it
would be disadvantageous to Industrial, since it would raise the
cost of future credit above what it would be in the absence of
Bank's potential interest in the reversion. If Bank is not likely to
be a lender on such reversionary rights, moreover, the efficiency
advantages of the rule to Bank will be small or nonexistent, and,
the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property
for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one
intended for security.
101 See § 2-106(1), quoted supra note 90. The interpretation of what constitutes a
"sale" for purposes of Article 9 remains sufficiently open to accommodate variation. See,
e.g., Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 394-96 (5th Cir. 1978) (indicating the
variety of factors bearing on a determination of whether a given transaction is a sale for
purposes of section 9-306(2)).
101 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
103 Cf. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 13, at 1164-82, for an exploration of a similar
blocking power (there called a "situational monopoly") in the context of after-acquired
property clauses and the suggestion that this power may justify the existence of a purchase
money priority.
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therefore, Bank and Industrial would normally want to contract
around a rule that includes the reversion in chattel paper.1 4 In the
case of possessory interests in the chattel paper, however, such a
contractual arrangement of priorities may be difficult to publicize
effectively.
A legal rule that removed this blocking power by providing
that chattel paper does not embody the reversion, would, under
the assumptions made, seem preferable to a rule mandating em-
bodiment, because it would be consistent with the contractual ar-
rangement between Bank and Industrial in the majority of cases.10 5
Yet such a justification for a nonembodiment rule depends on its
underlying premises: that chattel-paper financing is really a form
of accounts-receivable financing and that creditors want to finance
on a debtor's nonpossessory reversionary rights. A substantial por-
tion of chattel-paper financing, however, arises. out of "leveraged
lease" and associated transactions, in which the debtor is essen-
tially a nominal titleholder who borrows money from lenders to ac-
quire equipment from a supplier, which equipment is then leased
out to lessees.108 In these situations, because of the debtor's nomi-
nal nature, the lenders look virtually exclusively to the lessee, and
104 Cf. id. at 1172-73 (suggesting that in the absence of a rule, parties faced with the
blocking power of an after-acquired property clause will seek a contract provision giving
later lenders purchase money priority).
105 A rule providing that chattel paper does not embody the reversion reflects the fact
that in its absence parties will seek the same result by contract. Plainly, such a rule also
suggests that, as a matter of contractual intent between the debtor and a chattel-paper
financer, an assignment of "chattel paper" should, for purposes of interpreting the security
agreement-that is to say, for purposes of interpreting whether Bank has a security interest
in the collateral at all (which is part of the essentially contractual, two-party inquiry of what
Industrial and Bank intended, as opposed to the essentially third-party oriented inquiry
connected with issues of perfection)-be considered as assigning only the "account receiva-
ble" arising from the lease together with the ancillary contingent right of Industrial to use
the property for the duration of the lease to "secure" the face amount of that account re-
ceivable. The 1952 draft of Article 9 essentially defines chattel paper in terms that incorpo-
rate such an expected contractual arrangement between the parties: "'Chattel paper' means
a security agreement or lease of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by
delivery with appropriate indorsement or assignment." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1952). This
rule, of course, accommodates well the preceding analysis of the contractual intent underly-
ing a nonembodiment rule. The preceding analysis of the parties' intent is also consistent
with the result reached under pre-Code law. See, e.g., United States v. Shafto, 246 F.2d 338,
341-42 (4th Cir. 1957); Vadner v. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 166-67, 45 P.2d 561, 563 (1935);
Boss, supra note 45; see also Clark, supra note 62, at 237-38 (rule providing that the chattel
paper does not embody the reversion has a "metaphysical" appeal); Levie, supra note 2, at
940-41 (arguing that the purchaser of a lease takes only an assignor's interest in the lease);
see generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 154-155 (1936) (discussing reversions and pow-
ers of termination).
208 For a description of leveraged leasing, see Fritch & Shrank, Leveraged Leasing, in
EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 211 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman eds. 2d ed. 1980).
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ultimately to the equipment, for repayment.1 0 7
In this not insignificant category of cases, it is incorrect to as-
sume that the chattel-paper financers are simply financing on the
debtor's accounts receivable. They care both about the solvency of
the lessee and about the value of the equipment, both during the
term of the lease and, if the lease is for less than the life of the
equipment, thereafter. Nonetheless, nothing in the concept of
chattel paper calls for an embodiment of the reversionary right
while the goods are in the lessee's hands, instead of the debtor's.
Chattel paper exists to create the possessory-based advantages of
negotiability that come from paperizing an intangible, an account
receivable. Nothing we have yet seen suggests chattel paper also
exists to capture advantages associated with paperizing a right to
tangible property such as goods, except insofar as those rights are
inherently ancillary to the intangible rights being paperized.10
This is not to say that Article 9 could not have decided to
paperize all rights to goods that are in the hands of a buyer or
lessee of a debtor. On occasion, Article 9 paperizes a right to goods,
as it does when goods are held by a warehouseman who has issued
a negotiable warehouse receipt.109 But in those cases, control of the
goods is "locked up" in the paper as a matter of custom and proce-
dure independent of Article 9.11' No such custom to "lock up"
goods in chattel paper exists, and paperizing such rights without
an independent reason probably would not be worthwhile, given
the potential for "blocking" effects and other costs.
Consider the following consequences of such embodiment.
Rights in goods that were leased out for a short period, such as a
week or a month, would be paperized only during the lease term,
but not before or after, for the reasons we previously explored. '
This transient paperizing of a reversionary right would carry sub-
stantial costs and few gains.12 It would, of course, be possible to
consider perfecting an interest in chattel paper as an alternative
,07 Id. at 219.
108 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
101 See § 9-304(2). Comment 2 to section 9-304 states that subsection (2) reflects "the
position that, so long as a negotiable document covering goods is outstanding, title to the
goods is, so to say, locked up in the document and the proper way of dealing with such
goods is through the document."
110 See Article 7 ("Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents ofTitle").
m See supra notes 49-55, 81-86 and accompanying text.
"2 For example, one apparently would have to take possession of the chattel paper in
order to purchase the reversion safely. This would be especially troublesome in the case of
goods covered by certificates of title. See §§ 9-103(2), -302(3)(b).
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way of perfecting a reversionary interest in goods while the chattel
paper was outstanding, but unless that was coupled with a rule giv-
ing trumping advantage to the possessor of the chattel paper, none
of the normal advantages of paperizing rights would have been
gained.
Although I examine the rights of prior inventory financers
next, it is worth noting here that a trumping rule in favor of the
perfected chattel-paper holder would make sense only if the chat-
tel-paper financer were effectively a purchase-money lender who
enabled the debtor to acquire the goods. It is true that in leveraged
lease transactions the financers are often tantamount to purchase-
money lenders, who acquire purchase-money security interests in
goods being acquired. 113 But in these cases, the trumping should
not come simply from possession of the chattel paper, but should
depend on notification of prior inventory financers114 a process
that requires examination of the recording files. Once that has oc-
curred, the advantages of paperizing'the rights have all but dissi-
pated. Moreover, because of the conclusion that chattel paper does
not, and should not, continue to embody rights to goods once the
debtor is in possession of those goods,1 1 5 purchase-money financers
will often file financing statements against the debtor covering
those goods, irrespective of the embodiment rule regarding the
reversion.1
If the goods constitute "goods which are mobile and which are
of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction,1117 this
financing statement will be filed where the debtor is located,1 and
will serve to perfect the interest of the financers in the debtor's
rights to the goods, wherever the goods may be located. If, on the
other hand, the goods are not "mobile goods," as was the case in
11 Section 9-107(b) provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is...
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to
enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so
used.
114 See § 9-312(3); see generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 195 ("the ability of a
particular 'favored' subsequent claimant to take priority over an earlier secured party
should turn.., on the subsequent claimant's curing the ostensible ownership problem that
his interest may create for the earlier secured party").
lI See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
n' See, e.g., Reisman, Assignment of Equipment Leases by Sale or as Collateral, in
EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEvERAGED LEASING, supra note 102, at 883, 916-17 (discussing the
necessity of a filing covering the goods if a lender with a security interest in chattel paper
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Leasing Consultants, it is conceivable that the filing by the
financers will not perfect their interest in the debtor's reversion
while the goods are on lease in a state other than the state in
which the filing was made.11
But even in that case, the choice may not be between embodi-
ment of the reversionary rights in the chattel paper and multiple
filings. Section 9-304(3) provides that "[a] security interest in
goods in the possession of a bailee" can be perfected "by the
bailee's receipt of notification of the secured party's interest, '120
and such perfection is, under section 9-305, tantamount to perfec-
tion by the secured party.1 2 Nothing in Article 9 prevents lessees
in leveraged leasing or similar deals from constituting such bail-
ees,L22 and they can become bailees with notice simply by having
the financer's interest noted on the lease itself. This approach, un-
like an approach that embodies reversionary rights in chattel pa-
per, provides an easy mechanism whereby chattel paper financers
can choose, if it suits their needs, to take security interests in the
1" In that event, the filing needs to be made in the jurisdiction where the goods are
located. § 9-103(l). A filing made in the jurisdiction where the debtor keeps the goods will
not serve to perfect (beyond the protections of the four-month reperfection rule of section 9-
103(1)(d)) the interest in such goods when they are leased to a lessee who used them in
another jurisdiction. Section 9-103(1)(c) may require the filing to be made where the lessee
will use the goods if, in the leveraged leasing deal, the goods will go directly from the manu-
facturer to the lessee. Whether it will depends on the understanding of the debtor and the
financers at the time the security interest "attaches." The rules governing attachment ap-
pear in section 9-203.
120 § 9-304(3).
Section 9-305 provides that the secured party is deemed to have possession of the
goods for purposes of perfection "from the time the bailee receives notification of the se-
cured party's interest." See Looney v. Nuss (In re Miller), 545 F.2d 916, 918-19 (5th Cir.)
(under sections 9-304(3) and 9-305 possession by a bailee coupled with notification of the
secured party's interest was sufficient to perfect a security interest in certain paintings and
sculptures), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977). The test of whether a person holding goods is
a bailee for purposes of sections 9-304(3) and 9-305 is whether his possession serves "to
provide notice to prospective third party creditors that the debtor no longer has unfettered
use of [his] collateral." In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp. 134, 151 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd, 531 F.2d
1195 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Nunley, 671 F.2d 842, 845 (4th
Cir. 1982) (possession by bailee gave adequate notice that debtor no longer had "unfettered"
use of mining equipment, thus satisfying the requirements of § 9-305); Heinicke Instru-
ments Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 1976) (possession of stock certifi-
cate insufficient to indicate that stock was "fettered" and so insufficient to constitute a bail-
ment for purposes of § 9-305).
122 A recent bankruptcy case has suggested that one secured party cannot act as bailee
for another, Hale v. Kontaratos (In re Kontaratos), 10 Bankr. 956 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
This, however, runs contrary to pre-Code law, see Schram v. Sage, 46 F. Supp. 381, 388
(E.D. Mich. 1942), and the views of Professor Gilmore, see 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 4, §
14.2, at 440-41. See generally DeKoven, Secured Transactions, 38 Bus. LAw. 1195, 1212-14
(1983).
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reversion, externalized from the debtor, ascertainable by third par-
ties, and without creating the blocking power that an embodiment
rule creates in cases in which the chattel-paper financer is essen-
tially an accounts-receivable financer. 123
b. Chattel-paper financers and prior inventory financers. To
this point, we have been examining the rights of a chattel-paper
financer against subsequent secured creditors claiming an interest
in the goods through the debtor. This leaves, however, one impor-
tant category of embodiment conflicts. What are the rights of a
chattel-paper financer to goods "covered" by the chattel paper
when the conflict is with a prior secured party with a security in-
terest in, say, the inventory of a debtor such as Industrial?
If one starts with the assumption that chattel paper does not
embody reversionary rights in goods, the analysis with respect to
these rights is fundamentally one of interpreting Article 9's general
first-in-time rule.124 The more troublesome inquiry is the conflict
that can arise over those rights in goods that are embodied in chat-
tel paper.
Consider the following transaction. A bank, Savings, loans In-
dustrial money, taking and perfecting by a proper filing a security
interest in Industrial's "inventory wherever located, including af-
ter-acquired." When Industrial sells items from this inventory to
Manufacturer, in a transaction that creates chattel paper, Sav-
ings's direct interest in those items is likely to be cut off after
Manufacturer takes possession of the goods.125 But, under section
9-306(2), Savings's interest will shift automatically to the "pro-
ceeds" of this sale, which presumably means the chattel paper,12 8
and, under section 9-306(3), this interest in the chattel paper as
proceeds will remain perfected for ten days and, even if Savings
does nothing, for longer if Industrial's inventory prior to sale was
located in the same jurisdiction as Industrial's chief executive
'23 For an argument that "direct notification or payment directly from the account
debtor to the chattel-paper lender, protects the latter's interest by reducing the opportuni-
ties for collusion between the debtor and the account debtor," see Levie, supra note 2, at
937.
124 § 9-312(5).
125 Section 9-307(1) provides that "[a] buyer in ordinary course of business. . . takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence."
126 Section 9-306(2) provides that "a security interest. . . continues in any identifiable
proceeds." Section 9-203(3) provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed a security agreement
gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by Section 9-306." The 1972 revi-
sions to both these sections were designed to make it clear that this right to proceeds is
automatic. U.C.C. §§ 9-306, -203 reasons for 1972 change (1972).
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offices. 127
When Industrial uses the resulting chattel paper as collateral
in a subsequent transaction with Bank, the issue is joined: who
prevails as to the rights to goods that become embodied in the
chattel paper? The results articulated by Article 9 reflect the pri-
macy of possession associated with negotiability. In a possessory
chattel-paper transaction, Bank will prevail over Savings, whether
or not Bank knows of Savings's interest, if Bank can show that it
"gives new value and takes possession of [the chattel paper] in the
ordinary course of [Bank's] business,"'1 8 since, under section 9-
308(b), Savings is claiming the chattel paper "merely as proceeds
of inventory subject to a security interest."12 9 If Bank is not ac-
quiring the chattel paper for new value, but as security for an ante-
cedent debt (for example, if Bank is a financer on Industrial's ac-
counts receivable, however arising), or if Bank is relying on a
chattel paper filing, and not possession, Savings or Bank will pre-
vail in a priority dispute depending on who was the first to fie or
perfect.130 And if Savings had taken a security interest in "inven-
tory and chattel paper," then whether Bank could prevail over
Savings by taking possession of the chattel paper would depend on
whether Bank, at the time of giving new value and taking posses-
sion of the chattel paper, acted "without knowledge that the spe-
cific paper or instrument is subject to a security interest."'' Since
1" Section 9-306(3) states that the "security interests in proceeds is a continuously per-
fected security interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected," but provides
further that this continuously perfected interest lasts for only 10 days after receipt of the
proceeds by the debtor unless inter alia (and of relevance here), "a filed financing statement
covers the original collateral and the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may
be perfected by filing in the office or offices where the financing statement has been filed."
One files with respect to "ordinary" goods where the goods are located, § 9-103(1), and one
files with respect to chattel paper where the debtor is located, § 9-103(4) (incorporating § 9-
103(3) by reference). Section 9-103(3)(d) provides that a "debtor shall be deemed located at
his place of business if he has one, at his chief executive office if he has more than one place
of business, otherwise at his residence."
128 § 9-308.
129 § 9-308(b). Professors White and Summers have justified this result on the ground
that the chattel paper is "merely the frosting on the cake for the mere proceeds claimant."
J. WHrra & R. SuMMERs, supra note 43, § 25-17, at 1080. A different rationale will be devel-
oped in the following pages of this article.
Section 9-308 will not govern this dispute, since its preconditions have not been met.
The dispute between Savings and Bank thus falls under section 9-312(5), Article 9's residual
priority rule. See also § 9-312(6) (providing that the date of filing as to collateral is the date
of filing as to proceeds). For additional discussion of the priority rule governing a situation
such as the one described in text, see Clark, supra note 3, at 463-64, 470-72; Levie, supra
note 2, at 961-62.
131 § 9-308(a).
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Bank would not have knowledge that any specific chattel paper
was in fact subject to a security interest of Savings if all Bank had
seen were Savings's financing statement,3 2 Bank would, under
these facts, continue to prevail over Savings.
If Manufacturer were to default, and Industrial were to repos-
sess the goods under its security interest, Savings's interest in the
goods would reattach under section 9-306(5),' s' but Bank would
continue to prevail over Savings under section 9-306(5) "to the ex-
tent that the transferee of the chattel paper [Bank] was entitled to
priority under Section 9-308.'"'l
Section 9-306(5), therefore, provides a baseline rule involving
the sale of goods: if the inventory financer's direct security interest
in the goods is 'cut off by the sale to Manufacturer, then, when
Industrial reacquires the goods, although the inventory financer's
direct security interest in the goods "reattaches," it is subordinate
to any rights of the chattel-paper financer who took priority over
the inventory financer under section 9-308.
But once the goods are back in the hands of Industrial, isn't
Bank's right to priority over the inventory financer, based on pos-
session of the chattel paper, a "secret lien"? How is the inventory
financer to distinguish this (returned) good from other goods of In-
dustrial and how is it to determine whether a party such as Bank
exists? Elsewhere, Professor Baird and I have suggested that, in-
stead of engaging in a case-by-case analysis of the extent of the
inventory financer's reliance on the debtor's acquisition of goods, a
fixed rule may be preferable.5 5 Inventory financers should be noti-
fied when incoming inventory is subject to other property claims
that may have priority, be they claims of purchase-money sellers,
lessors, or consignors, unless such competing property interests ex-
ist for a short enough time so as to obviate the desirability of
notification."'8
'32 Unless the financing statement specifically mentioned particular chattel paper, all
the financing statement would reveal was that Savings claimed, or might claim, a security
interest in "chattel paper." See § 9-402(1) (a financing statement need only indicate the
"types" of collateral it covers). Such general knowledge of a potential interest in chattel
paper would not seem to satisfy the more particularized requirement of section 9-308(a).
I" § 9-306(5)(a); see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. McCoy (In re Frontier Mobile Home
Sales, Inc.), 635 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that a security interest in inventory reat-
taches to repossessed goods under § 9-306(5)(a)).
134 § 9-306(5)(b). "[T]o the extent" should mean not just "if," but should also, consis-
tent with the contours of embodiment in chattel paper, reflect the limited embodiment of
rights to goods in the chattel paper. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
13' Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 206-09.
15M Such a short-term interest, for example, may be the reclamation right of sellers
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The same principle applies here. Bank should be able to assert
a priority in the reacquired goods based on its possession of the
chattel paper only if, at some time before or shortly after the reac-
quisition of goods, Bank has notified Savings, the inventory
financer, that it is, or may be, taking a security interest in chattel
paper.137
What occurs, however, if the transaction between Industrial
and Manufacturer was a lease, and not a sale? In that case, some
authority suggests that Savings does not have a security interest in
the chattel paper as "proceeds" of Savings's security interest in in-
ventory, on the ground that a true lease of goods is not a "sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral. ' 13 8 This
means that Bank would defeat Savings with respect to the stream
of rental payments from Manufacturer to Industrial under the
lease, whether or not Bank met the requirements of section 9-
308.119 But there is no particular reason why an inventory financer
should not be able to assert a security interest in the partial dispo-
sition represented by a lease. Such a result avoids, in the first in-
stance at least, distinguishing between "sales" and "leases." More-
over, the issue here, as is usually the case in secured transactions,
is less whether Savings should enjoy a security interest than
whether that interest should (a) remain perfected and (b) remain
prior to the claim of other parties.1 0 A system that gave Savings a
security interest in the lease as a "proceed" of at least a part of
Savings's rights in the goods could handle both of these issues: the
first, by application of section 9-306(3);141 the second, by applica-
tion of the priority rules of section 9-308.142
under sections 2-507, -702. For a discussion of the seller's reclamation right in connection
with the problems of ostensible ownership, see Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 206-09.
137 Section 9-312(3) requires the holder of the purchase-money security interest seeking
priority over a conflicting security interest in inventory to provide notice before the debtor
receives the goods. Other rules (such as reperfection rules, see § 9-103(1)(d), or the rights of
reclaiming sellers, see supra note 136) perhaps suggest that Industrial should enjoy a rea-
sonable grace period.
I" § 9-306(1). See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Cleary Bros. Constr. Co., 9 Bankr. 40,
41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) ("[t]he words 'otherwise disposed of' related to a permanent or
final conversion, not a temporary use").
13 If Savings had taken only a security interest in inventory, and if section 9-306(2),
providing that "a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or
other disposition," is not applicable, Savings would not even have a security interest, much
less a perfected one, in the stream of rental payments.
10 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
141 Section 9-306i3) establishes the circumstances in which a perfected security interest
in proceeds continues from a perfected security interest in the original collateral.
14, Section 9-308 delineates the circumstances in which a purchaser of chattel paper
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In either event, what would be Bank's and Savings's respective
rights to the leased goods? With respect to the reversion, as we
have seen,143 the answer is relatively straightforward: even assum-
ing Bank wishes to claim a security interest in that reversion, it is
not embodied in the chattel paper, and the general first-to-file-or-
perfect rule of Article 9 therefore should continue to apply. The
answer, however, is different with respect to the lessor's rights to
the goods during the term of the lease. This right is ancillary to
the right to the stream of rental payments-it is what buttresses
the value of Manufacturer's promise to pay rentals. As such, it is
tied to the "account receivable" arising out of the lease.""4 If Sav-
ings has no claim to that account, as common wisdom suggests,
Savings should have no claim to the ancillary right to use the prop-
erty during the term of the lease. 145 And if Savings enjoys-as I
have argued it should-a security interest in the lease, whether
Bank or Savings prevails depends on whether Bank meets the re-
quirements of section 9-308.
No matter what the resolution of this priority dispute might
be while Manufacturer is in possession of the goods under lease
from Industrial, when Industrial reacquires the leased goods fol-
lowing a default by Manufacturer, there is no reason not to apply
the analysis that we have used with respect to sales. 4 6 Upon reac-
quisition, it is conceptually possible to view Savings's interest
(whether or not in existence the moment before) as reattaching,
since Savings retained an interest in the reversion, which is now
merged with the other rights of Industrial, and the goods hence-
forth become inventory of Industrial's again. Vis-a-vis Bank, how-
ever, the status of Savings's rights should depend on whether Bank
complied with the notification requirements discussed above with
respect to sales. 47 If Bank gives such 'notice, and assuming that
Bank could have prevailed against Savings with respect to Indus-
trial's rights to the goods while the goods were with Manufacturer
pursuant to the lease, Bank should continue to prevail notwith-
standing reacquisition of the goods by Industrial.
takes priority over a conflicting security interest in the proceeds of inventory.
143 See supra notes 102-23 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 9-30, 81 and accompanying text.
145 The "term of the lease" should be defined to encompass only the mandatory re-
maining term. Should Manufacturer have had options to renew, for example, failure to exer-
cise these options would have amounted to a nondefault termination of the lease, and hence
a reacquisition under the reversion. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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This leaves one troublesome case: the termination of the
transaction between Industrial and Manufacturer, not through
breach, but by consent, either ex post (the parties mutually agree
to terminate the deal) or ex ante (as when Manufacturer has nego-
tiated an option to cancel). Consider the case where Industrial sells
goods to Manufacturer on installment and then, when Manufac-
turer has payment difficulties, Manufacturer and Industrial agree
to allow Industrial to retake the goods (and title thereto) in ex-
change for the cancellation of Manufacturer's payment obligation.
When Industrial repossesses the goods, what, if any, rights does
Bank continue to have? Is Industrial's right to repossess the goods
under these circumstances a reversionary-type right, not embodied
in the chattel paper, or is this a right "ancillary" to the payment
obligation?
Since this consensual repossession is functionally equivalent to
a reacquisition and retention following default under section 9-
505,148 there appears to be little reason not to conclude that the
right is ancillary to the lease and embodied in the chattel paper.
Industrial, to avoid the expense and hassle of litigation, exchanges
its rights to repossess the goods and to sue Manufacturer for any
deficiency, for the release by each side of its rights against the
other. This exchange should not change the nature of the embod-
ied interests: the chattel paper should continue to embody Indus-
trial's right to the goods.1 49 But upon reacquisition of the goods by
Industrial, Bank will nonetheless have to file for protection against
subsequent creditors and notify Savings or other prior creditors.
Is the situation the same, however, when the transaction is
terminated not by the mutual agreement of Manufacturer and In-
dustrial at the time of termination, but by Manufacturer's exercise
of a unilateral right, such as an option to cancel (or not to renew)
under a lease? Manufacturer's unilateral power to terminate with-
out breach, mutually agreed to at the time of entering the lease, is
fundamentally different from the negotiated termination ex post,
which requires consent of both parties. In the former case, Manu-
facturer's bargained-for right is a part of the value of the package
negotiated; in the latter case, the termination is a substitution for
rights that had previously existed and had been valued. For this
reason, chattel paper's embodiment of Industrial's rights in the
"4 Section 9-505(2) provides that "a secured party in possession may, after default,
propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation."
149 The example would be fundamentally the same if it were a mutual cancellation of a
lease during its term, rather than the mutual cancellation of a sale.
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goods should encompass only those rights up to the time of Manu-
facturer's unilateral exercise of a right of cancellation. Once Manu-
facturer exercises that right, the chattel paper financer's right to
use the goods, as ancillary to the right of payment, disappears, as
does the right of payment itself.
CONCLUSION
Chattel paper exists as a category of collateral because it
paperizes an intangible: the account receivable. In so doing, chattel
paper becomes a type of collateral with attributes of negotiability,
principal among which are the role of possession and the fact that
one need only examine the paper for information surrounding
transfers of the collateral. In creating chattel paper, however, the
concept of collateral ultimately must embody not only the intangi-
ble right, but also, to some extent, rights in tangible objects known
as goods. This is so because the value of the paperized account
depends on the package of rights that exists against the account
debtor and his other creditors.
The role of embodiment in chattel paper of rights in goods,
however, can be understood only in relation to Article 9's larger
concern with establishing a system of priority and filing rules
based, in the first instance, on the physical possession of tangible
personal property by a debtor. 150 When a debtor has such posses-
sion, Article 9 establishes-incompletely, to be sure'51-a principle
that all security interests in such goods can be disclosed very sim-
ply by a skeletal filing system. But when a debtor is not in posses-
sion of such goods, and therefore the misleading implications of
ownership stemming from possession by the debtor do not arise,
Article 9 places the burden on other parties to find out the status
of the debtor's ownership rights in that property.
Embodiment in chattel paper of rights to tangible collateral is
part and parcel of that structure. While the debtor is in possession
of goods, rights to those goods should not be deemed to be embod-
ied in any chattel paper resulting from transactions in those goods,
because of the ostensible ownership problems otherwise created.
There is, however, nothing fundamentally inconsistent with the
principle of ostensible ownership in permitting embodiment while
the goods are out of the debtor's hands. Yet whether and to what
150 The force of such a system is explored in Baird & Jackson, supra note 4, at 179-90.
'15 See id. at 187-88, 197-201, 209-12, for a discussion of circumstances in which Article
9 uses an abstract concept such as "title" rather than possession to determine property
rights.
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extent embodiment during the period of nonpossession should be
deemed to exist depends, in the first instance, on the costs associ-
ated with placing the risks on one party rather than on another. A
conclusion that reversionary-type rights to goods should not be
embodied in chattel paper stems not so much from the possibility
that embodiment will raise misleading implications, but, rather,
from a sense that a contrary conclusion would sweep too broadly,
requiring third parties to negotiate with a chattel paper financer
while providing no associated benefits.
With respect to the rights to the goods that are ancillary to
the payment right, embodiment is a necessary part of making the
associated account receivable more negotiable. Such embodiment
is without ostensible ownership problems, as long as it is con-
strained so as to apply only while the debtor is out of possession.
Subsequent parties are put to finding out the relationship between
the possessor and the debtor; when they learn about that relation-
ship, they have the ability to find out whether there are prior par-
ties who have claimed any property rights in the debtor's rights in
such property. But the justification for embodiment lasts only so
long as the debtor is out of possession of the collateral-a conclu-
sion section 9-306(5) expresses somewhat incompletely and inade-
quately, but nonetheless clearly.
If we all were sensitive to the reasons for the existence of chat-
tel paper as a category of collateral and to the direct relation be-
tween embodiment and the ostensible ownership principle, much
of the mystique surrounding chattel paper would disappear. With
such an understanding, we would, at long last, be able to handle
chattel paper questions without engaging in theoretical distinctions
that have no practical application.
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